Publications - David Yates Philosophy

On this page you will find details of my publications and works in progress. Clicking the links will take you to PhilPapers archive copies. If you need a published version for citation purposes and you can’t find it on PhilPapers, email me. I normally don’t post works in progress on public archives, but if you’re interested, let me know and I’ll send you a draft (if one exists).

Edited Volumes

Rethinking Emergence (ed. with Amanda Bryant). Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2024. Abstract
This book aims to explore connections between recent approaches to scientific emergence (for instance integrative pluralism and contextual emergence), emergence in antiquity (particularly Aristotelian hylomorphism) and contemporary developments in the metaphysics of emergence (e.g. metaontoology, grounding, and transfomation / fusion). It features 14 original contributions from: Alastair Wilson, Anna Marmodoro, Barbara Drossel, Carl Gillett, Daniel de Haan, David Yates, Jessica Wilson, Michael Silberstein, Paul Humphreys, Robin Hendry, Sandra Mitchell, Umut Baysan, Vanessa Seifert, and William Jaworski. Paul Humphreys’ chapter will be published here posthumously, with kind permission from his family. We dedicate this book to Paul’s memory.
Chalmers on Virtual Reality. (Special Issue of Disputatio, ed. with Ricardo Santos). De Gruyter. 2019. Abstract
In June 2016, David Chalmers delivered the Petrus Hispanus Lectures at the LanCog research group, University of Lisbon, on the subject of objects, properties, and perception in virtual reality environments. The paper resulting from these lectures was subsequently published in Disputatio as ‘The Virtual and the Real’ (vol. IX, 2017, No. 46, pp. 309–52). In it, Chalmers defends virtual realism, according to which virtual objects are bona fide digital objects with virtual counterparts of perceptible properties such as colour and shape, and perception in virtual reality environments is typically veridical rather than illusory. This special issue collects responses to Chalmers due to Claus Beisbart, Jesper Juul, Peter Ludlow, Neil McDonnell and Nathan Wildman, Alyssa Ney, Eric Schwitzgebel, and Marc Silcox; together with a detailed response by Chalmers to each paper.
The Metaphysics of Relations (ed. with Anna Marmodoro). Oxford University Press. 2016. Abstract
Fifteen philosophers offer new essays exploring the metaphysics of relations from antiquity to the present day. They address topics as diverse as ancient and medieval reasons for scepticism about polyadic properties; recent attempts to reduce causal and spatiotemporal relations; recent work on the directionality of relational properties; powers ontologies and their associated problems; whether the most promising interpretations of quantum mechanics posit a fundamentally relational world; and whether the very idea of such a world is coherent. From those who question whether there are relational properties at all, to those who hold they are a fundamental part of reality, The Metaphysics of Relations covers a broad spectrum of positions on the nature and ontological status of relations, from antiquity to the present day.

Journal Articles and Book Chapters

‘Hylomorphism, or Something Near Enough’, in David Yates & Amanda Bryant (eds.) Rethinking Emergence. Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2024.Abstract
Hylomorphists hold that substances are, in some sense, composites of matter and form. The form of a substance is typically taken to play a fundamental role in determining the unity or identity of the whole. Staunch hylomorphists think that this role is of a kind that precludes the ontological reduction of form to the physical and thus take their position to be inconsistent with physicalism. Forms, according to staunch hylomorphism, play a fundamental role in grounding their bearers’ proper parts and that, it seems, rules out the physical grounding of form itself. I shall develop a physicalist version of hylomorphism that treats form as geometric structure and which, I shall argue, entails many of the central theses endorsed by staunch hylomorphists. Based on Shoemaker’s notion of conditional powers, I shall argue that the geometric structures of complex wholes are the conditions on at least some of the conditional powers of their bearers’ proper parts, transforming those powers into powers simpliciter. Thus, forms play a fundamental role in the dynamical evolution of the physical world, but without bestowing causal powers themselves and hence without violating the causal closure of the physical domain. If a substance’s proper parts are taken to be individuated by their powers simpliciter, then they derive their identities from their places in the substantial whole, which thus determines the identities of its proper parts without changing their intrinsic natures.
‘From Multilevel Explanation to Downward Causation’, in Alaistair Wilson & Katie Robertson (eds.) Levels of Explanation. Oxford Universitry Press, forthcoming 2024.Abstract
The causal closure of the physical poses a familiar causal exclusion problem for the special sciences that stems from the idea that if closure is true, then fundamental physical properties do all the causal work involved in bringing about physical effects. In this paper I aim to show that the strongest causal closure principle that is not ruled out by some simple physics in fact allows for a certain kind of downward causation, which in turn makes room for robust special science autonomy. I focus on the case of vector composition, arguing that it involves irreducibly multilevel causation. To give a complete causal explanation of what goes on in cases that involve the effects of multiple forces, we need to appeal not only to the fundamental properties that generate those forces, but also to geometric properties that determine how multiple vectors compose. However, if all the causal work involved in such cases were due to fundamental physical properties, there would be a one-level explanation available. Hence, I argue, it cannot be the case that fundamental physical properties do all the causal work. The extra causal work, I suggest, comes from the fact that the causal powers bestowed by fundamental physical properties have irreducibly geometric manifestation conditions. I defend the resulting form of downward causation as a solution to the problem of special science autonomy, and discuss two potential accounts of its source, in terms of the debate between kinematic and dynamic theories of the origins of spacetime symmetries.
‘Emergência’. COMPÊNDIO EM LINHA DE PROBLEMAS DE FILOSOFIA ANALÍTICA 2022 1-33. 2022.Abstract
Neste artigo, discuto o problema das propriedades emergentes, começando por apresentar uma concepção tradicional de acordo com a qual estas propriedades exibem três características definidoras: elas dependem de propriedades e relações físicas, mas constituem, em relação a estas, uma novidade e, como tal, não são delas deduzíveis. Em primeiro lugar, discuto algumas das razões gerais que explicam o facto de tradicionalmente se supor que este tipo de novidade – e.g. causal ou qualitativa – parece exigir que as propriedades emergentes não se encontram, de todo, fisicamente fundadas, não podendo ser deduzidas das suas bases físicas. Portanto, a dependência física das propriedades emergentes não pode ser explicada, o que é normalmente tido como misterioso. Recorrendo a uma concepção funcionalista de dedutibilidade, discuto de seguida, com mais detalhe, a relação entre a novidade e a não-dedutibilidade, realçando o modo como os diferentes tipos de não-dedutibilidade conduzem a diferentes tipos de novidade e, como tal, a diferentes formas de emergência. Finalmente, considero algumas abordagens científicas modernas que rejeitam a não-dedutibilidade enquanto condição necessária da emergência. Segundo tais abordagens, o tipo de novidade associado às propriedades emergentes é compatível com uma fundação física, o que, por sua vez, faz desvanecer o mistério e confere respeitabilidade científica à noção de emergência. Concluirei estabelecendo comparações entre estas abordagens e o hilomorfismo neo-Aristotélico.
‘Thinking about Spacetime’, in Christian Wüthrich, Baptiste Le Bihan & Nick Huggett (eds.), Philosophy Beyond Spacetime, Oxford University Press (2021). Abstract
Several different quantum gravity research programmes suggest, for various reasons, that spacetime is not part of the fundamental ontology of physics. This gives rise to the problem of empirical coherence: if fundamental physical entities do not occupy spacetime or instantiate spatiotemporal properties, how can fundamental theories concerning those entities be justified by observation of spatiotemporally located things like meters, pointers and dials? I frame the problem of empirical coherence in terms of entailment: how could a non-spatiotemporal fundamental theory entail spatiotemporal evidence propositions? Solutions to this puzzle can be classified as realist or antirealist, depending on whether or not they posit a non-fundamental spacetime structure grounded in or caused by the fundamental structure. These approaches place different constraints on our everyday concepts of space and time. Applying lessons from the philosophy of mind, I argue that only realism is both conceptually plausible and suitable for addressing the problem at hand. I suggest a role functionalist version of realism, which is consistent with both grounding and causation, and according to which our everyday concepts reveal something of the true nature of emergent spacetime.
‘Neural Synchrony and the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness’, Topoi 39 (5): 1057-1072 (2020).Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to address a well-known dilemma for physicalism. If mental properties are type identical to physical properties, then their causal efficacy is secure, but at the cost of ruling out mentality in creatures very different to ourselves. On the other hand, if mental properties are multiply realizable, then all kinds of creatures can instantiate them, but then they seem to be causally redundant. The causal exclusion problem depends on the widely held principle that realized properties inherit their causal powers from their realizers. While this principle holds for functional realization, it fails on a broader notion of realization that permits the realization of complex qualitative properties such as spatial and temporal patterns. Such properties are best seen as dependent powerful qualities, which have their causal roles in virtue of being the qualities they are, and do not inherit powers from their realizers. Recent studies have identified one such property—neural synchrony—as a correlate of consciousness. If synchrony is also partially constitutive of consciousness, then phenomenal properties are both multiply realizable and causally novel. I outline a version of representationalism about consciousness on which this constitution claim holds.
‘A Strange Kind of Power: Vetter on the Formal Adequacy of Dispositionalism’, Philosophical Inquiries 8 (1): 97-116 (2020). Abstract
According to dispositionalism about modality, a proposition <p> is possible just in case something has, or some things have, a power or disposition for its truth; and <p> is necessary just in case nothing has a power for its falsity. But are there enough powers to go around? In Yates (2015) I argued that in the case of mathematical truths such as <2+2=4>, nothing has the power to bring about their falsity or their truth, which means they come out both necessary and not possible. Combining this with axiom (T), it is easy to derive a contradiction. I suggested that dispositionalists ought to retreat a little and say that <p> is possible just in case either p, or there is a power to bring it about that p, grounding the possibility of mathematical propositions in their truth rather than in powers. Vetter’s (2015) has the resources to provide a response to my argument, and in her (2018) she explicitly addresses it by arguing for a plenitude of powers, based on the idea that dispositions come in degrees, with necessary properties a limiting case of dispositionality. On this view there is a power for <2+2=4>, without there being a power to bring about its truth. In this paper I argue that Vetter’s case for plenitude does not work. However, I suggest, if we are prepared to accept metaphysical causation, a case can be made that there is indeed a power for <2+2=4>.
‘Chalmers on Virtual Reality’ (with Ricardo Santos), Disputatio 11 (55): 291-296 (2019). Abstract
In June 2016, David Chalmers delivered the Petrus Hispanus Lectures at the LanCog research group, University of Lisbon, on the subject of objects, properties, and perception in virtual reality environments. The paper resulting from these lectures was subsequently published in Disputatio as ‘The Virtual and the Real’. In it, Chalmers defends virtual realism, according to which virtual objects are bona fide digital objects with virtual counterparts of perceptible properties such as colour and shape, and perception in virtual reality environments is typically veridical rather than illusory. This special issue collects responses to Chalmers due to Claus Beisbart, Jesper Juul, Peter Ludlow, Neil McDonnell and Nathan Wildman, Alyssa Ney, Eric Schwitzgebel, and Marc Silcox; together with a detailed response by Chalmers to each paper. This introduction summarises the main arguments of the target article, and gives a brief overview of the commentaries.
‘Critical Notice: Emergence’, Analysis 78 (3): 557-562 (2018).Abstract
Paul Humphreys’ main aim in this wide-ranging and ambitious book is to defend a novel account of ontological emergence he refers to as transformational emergence. His secondary aims are many: to show how ontological emergence so understood can be usefully seen against the backdrop of a reductionist position he calls generative atomism ; to compare and contrast his preferred position with historical and contemporary alternatives; and to consider a range of scientific cases both as potential examples of ontological emergence and of weaker forms of emergence stemming from our computational or conceptual limitations. Humphreys is clear from the outset that the range of scientific cases that satisfy certain positive criteria for emergence is too diverse for a single, unified account, and he is more concerned to highlight the differences that preclude such an account than to abstract away from them. The result is a mosaic of case studies, to which are applied a range of alternative conceptions of emergence, drawing out various similarities and differences between the cases, and assessing their credentials as emergent according to the various alternative conceptions considered.
‘Three Arguments for Humility’, Philosophical Studies 175 (2): 461-481 (2018). Abstract
Ramseyan humility is the thesis that we cannot know which properties realize the roles specified by the laws of completed physics. Lewis seems to offer a sceptical argument for this conclusion. Humean fundamental properties can be permuted as to their causal roles and distribution throughout spacetime, yielding alternative possible worlds with the same fundamental structure as actuality, but at which the totality of available evidence is the same. On the assumption that empirical knowledge requires evidence, we cannot know which of these worlds is actual. However, Lewis also appeals to a range of familiar semantic principles when framing his argument, which leads some authors to suppose that he can also plausibly be interpreted as offering a purely semantic argument for humility in addition. In this paper I grant that these arguments are Lewisian, but argue that Lewis is also committed to a theory of mind that licenses a purely metaphysical argument for humility based on the idea that mental properties supervene on fundamental structure. Given that knowing which x is the F requires knowing that a is the F, the supposition that we could come to know which properties actually occupy the fundamental roles entails differences in mental properties between worlds with the same fundamental structure, violating supervenience. Humility follows right away, without any further epistemic or semantic principles. This argument is immune to almost every way of rebutting the sceptical and semantic arguments; conversely, almost every way of rebutting the metaphysical argument tells equally against the others.
‘Inverse Functionalism and the Individuation of Powers’, Synthese 195 (10): 4525-4550 (2018).Abstract
In the pure powers ontology (PPO), basic physical properties have wholly dispositional essences. PPO has clear advantages over categoricalist ontologies, which suffer from familiar epistemological and metaphysical problems. However, opponents argue that because it contains no qualitative properties, PPO lacks the resources to individuate powers, and generates a regress. The challenge for those who take such arguments seriously is to introduce qualitative properties without reintroducing the problems that PPO was meant to solve. In this paper, I distinguish the core claim of PPO: (i) basic physical properties have dispositional essences, from a hitherto unnoticed assumption: (ii) the dispositional essences of basic physical properties exclusively involve type-causal relations to other basic physical properties. I reject (ii), making room for a structuralist ontology in which all basic physical properties are pure powers, individuated by their places in a causal structure that includes not only other powers, but also physically realized qualitative properties such as shapes, patterns and structures. Such qualities individuate pure powers in the way that non-mental input and output properties individuate realized mental properties in functionalist theories of mind, except that here it is basic physical powers that are individuated by relations to realized non-powers. I distinguish one Platonic and two Aristotelian version of this theory, and argue that the Aristotelian versions require that grounding is not always a relative fundamentality relation, because the powers ground the qualities that individuate them. By considering ontic structural realism, I argue that symmetric grounding is the best way to make sense of relational individuation in structuralist ontologies, and is therefore no additional commitment of the one proposed here.
‘Demystifying Emergence’, Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3: 809-841 (2016).Abstract
Are the special sciences autonomous from physics? Those who say they are need to explain how dependent special science properties could feature in irreducible causal explanations, but that’s no easy task. The demands of a broadly physicalist worldview require that such properties are not only dependent on the physical, but also physically realized. Realized properties are derivative, so it’s natural to suppose that they have derivative causal powers. Correspondingly, philosophical orthodoxy has it that if we want special science properties to bestow genuinely new causal powers, we must reject physical realization and embrace a form of emergentism, in which such properties arise from the physical by mysterious brute determination. In this paper, I argue that contrary to this orthodoxy, there are physically realized properties that bestow new causal powers in relation to their realizers. The key to my proposal is to reject causal-functional accounts of realization and embrace a broader account that allows for the realization of shapes and patterns. Unlike functional properties, such properties are defined by qualitative, non-causal specifications, so realizing them does not consist in bestowing causal powers. This, I argue, allows for causal novelty of the strongest kind. I argue that the molecular geometry of H2O—a qualitative, multiply realizable property—plays an irreducible role in explaining its dipole moment, and thereby bestows novel powers. On my proposal, special science properties can have the kind of causal novelty traditionally associated with strong emergence, without any of the mystery.
‘Is Powerful Causation an Internal Relation?’, in Anna Marmodoro & David Yates (eds.), The Metaphysics of Relations, Oxford University Press (2016): 138-156.Abstract
In this paper I consider whether a powers ontology facilitates a reduction of causal relations to intrinsic powers of the causal relata. I first argue that there is a tension in the view that powerful causation is an internal relation in this sense. Powers are ontologically dependent on other powers for their individuation, but in that case—given an Aristotelian conception of properties as immanent universals—powers will not be intrinsic on several extant analyses of ‘intrinsic’, since to possess a given power P requires the existence of other concrete particulars as bearers of the powers that individuate P. I suggest several ways for Aristotelians to resolve this tension, but all tenable options involve individuative type-level causal relations between powers. While these individuative relations between powers are internal in the sense that the powers are essentially related, this is a different sense of ‘ internal ’ to the one that entails reducibility. The proposed reduction of token-causal relations to powers succeeds only at the cost of irreducible type-level causal relations between the powers themselves.
‘Introduction: The Metaphysics of Relations’ (with Anna Marmodoro), In Anna Marmodoro & David Yates (eds.), The Metaphysics of Relations. Oxford University Press (2016): 1-18.Abstract
An introduction to our edited volume, The Metaphysics of Relations, covering a range of issues including the problem of order, the ontological status of relations, reasons for ancient scepticism about relational properties, and two ways of drawing the distinction between internal and external relations.
‘Dispositionalism and the Modal Operators’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2): 411-424 (2015).Abstract
Actualists of a certain stripe—dispositionalists—hold that metaphysical modality is grounded in the powers of actual things. Roughly: p is possible iff something has, or some things have, the power to bring it about that p. Extant critiques of dispositionalism focus on its material adequacy, and question whether there are enough powers to account for all the possibilities we intuitively want to countenance. For instance, it seems possible that none of the actual contingent particulars ever existed, but it is impossible to explain this by appealing to the powers of some actual thing or things to bring it about. I argue instead that dispositionalism, in the simple form championed by its proponents, is formally inadequate. Dispositionalists interpret the modal operators as simple existential claims about powers, but if we interpret the operators that way, the resulting system of modal logic is too weak to capture metaphysical modality. I argue that we can modify the standard dispositionalist interpretations of the operators to secure formal adequacy, but at the cost of accepting that not all modality is grounded in powers. This, I shall suggest, is not a bad thing—the resulting theory still has powers at its core and has certain attractive features, in addition to formal adequacy, that the standard theory lacks.
‘The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1): 93-128 (2013).Abstract
Dispositional essentialists argue that physical properties have their causal roles essentially. This is typically taken to mean that physical properties are identical to dispositions. I argue that this is untenable, and that we must instead say that properties bestow dispositions. I explore what it is for a property to have such a role essentially. Dispositional essentialists argue for their view by citing certain epistemological and metaphysical implications, and I appeal to these implications to place desiderata on the concept of essence involved. I argue that the traditional modal theory of essence meets these desiderata, but that the resulting theory wrongly implies that certain dispositions essential to mass are essential to charge, thereby offering a new argument against modal theories of essence. I argue that dispositional essentialism requires a primitive notion of essence, and develop a primitivist theory based on Kit Fine’s views. I show that the primitivist theory has all the virtues of the modal alternative, and none of the vices. I develop a novel way of thinking about the relationship between properties, laws and dispositions, and argue that it has distinct advantages over standard dispositional essentialist formulations.
‘Critical Notice: Mind and Cosmos’, Analysis 73 (4): 801-806 (2013).Abstract
In Thomas Nagel’s book, Mind and Cosmos, it is argued that phenomena such as consciousness cannot be rendered intelligible without appealing to natural teleology. Here I distinguish two notions of intelligibility, between which I argue Nagel equivocates.
‘Emergence’, in Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Mind. SAGE Reference (2013): 283-287.Abstract
This article shows that several distinct forms of emergence can be defined in terms of non-deducibility, by highlighting several distinct reasons (both ontological and epistemological) for which Kimian functional reductions can fail.
‘Functionalism and the Metaphysics of Causal Exclusion’, Philosophers’ Imprint 12: 1-25 (2012).Abstract
Given their physical realization, what causal work is left for functional properties to do? Humean solutions to the exclusion problem (e.g. overdetermination and difference-making) typically appeal to counterfactual and/or nomic relations between functional property-instances and behavioural effects, tacitly assuming that such relations suffice for causal work. Clarification of the notion of causal work, I argue, shows not only that such solutions don’t work, but also reveals a novel solution to the exclusion problem based on the relations between dispositional properties at different levels of mechanism, which involves three central claims: (i) the causal work of properties consists in grounding dispositions, (ii) functional properties are dispositions, and (iii) the dispositions of mechanisms are grounded in the dispositions of their components. Treating functional mental properties as dispositions of components in psychological mechanisms, I argue that such properties do the causal work of grounding agent-level dispositions. These dispositions, while ultimately grounded in the physical realizers of mental properties, are indirectly so grounded, through a hierarchy of grounding relations that extends upwards, of necessity, through the mental domain.
‘Emergence, Downwards Causation, and the Completeness of Physics’, Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234): 110-131 (2009).Abstract
The completeness of physics is the key premise in the causal argument for physicalism. However, standard formulations of it fail to rule out emergent downward causation, so standard formulations of the causal argument are invalid. Drawing on the notion of causal power bestowal, I formulate a suitable principle, which I call ‘strong completeness’. I first investigate the metaphysical implications of strong completeness, and argue that categoricalist accounts of properties are better equipped to formulate this principle than dispositional essentialist accounts. I then investigate the epistemological implications of strong completeness, and argue that the additional evidence needed for this key principle renders the causal argument otiose for any properties amenable to scientific reduction. Evidence for a completeness principle suitable for framing the causal argument is strong enough to warrant physicalism directly.
‘Response-Dependence’, Philosophical Books 49 (4): 344-354 (2008).Abstract
The paper covers a range of topics of recent interest in relation to response-depdendence: its characterisation in terms of ‘basic equations’, its application to areas such as ethics, colour theory and philosophy of mind, and the ‘missing explanation’ argument.

Book Reviews

Robert Cummins. The World in the Head (OUP 2010), Analysis 72 (1): 193-196 (2012).
Robert Koons & George Bealer (eds.) The Waning of Materialism (OUP 2010) Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247): 420-422 (2012).

In Progress

The Causal Structure of Reality
This is a book project I am working on in which I hope to unify several strands of research I have been developing over the past few years. The leading idea is to develop a layered model of reality based on a powers ontology. Current directions include: how the essential nature of fundamental physical powers can refer to non-fundamental, higher-level properties; developing a robustly layered ontology ordered by grounding relations rather than “spooky” emergence; and what to say about all this if (as many suspect it already is turning out) it turns out that spacetime itself is emergent.

A paper on the Mentaculus account of time’s arrows
In this one I argue that the Mentaculus, due to Albert and Loewer, fails to account for the thermodynamic arrow of time. Boltzmann’s account of the thermodynamic arrow basically says ice cubes melt and the milk mixes evenly with the coffee because there are overwhelmingly more ways for that to happen than not. However, given the time-reversal invariance of the dynamical laws, this account predicts that things evolve towards higher entropy in both the past and the future, which is obviously false. The Mentaculus adds to Bolzmann’s account a low entropy boundary condition called the past hypothesis, which breaks the symemtry. The Mentaculus account of time’s arrow then says that things evolve towards higher entropy in the temporal direction that points away from the past hypothesis. It’s very neat, but while it may account for why ice cubes melt rather than not, it cannot account for why complex mechanisms such as pendulum clocks are oriented with respect to the entropy gradient in the very precise way that they are. For that you need to factor in a primitively asymmetric causal relation as well. So, at least, I argue in this paper, whose title is redacted for blind review. There is a draft of this one available if you are interested.

Something Fabulous on Representationalism and Consciousness
I am totally persuaded that some form of impure representationalism about consciousness must be correct, and that the phenomenal manner of representation must be specifiable in broadly physicalist terms. I had a first stab at working out something along these lines in my Topoi article (see above). I am also persuaded that a proper understanding of the phenomenal manner of representation, particularly how it could be both physically grounded and qualitative, will make clear what’s wrong with certain arguments for panpsychism. This entry on the list represents a vague hope I have of unifying all these thoughts into a paper. It’s going to combine a nomic structuralist notion of representation with non-spooky emergence and provide a proper grounding for the causal efficacy of consciousness and it’s going to be amazing. There is definitely no draft of this one available.