Project Events

On this page you will find details of selected workshops and seminars organized by the EITNS project and as part of my FCT exploratory project “Emergent Spacetime in Quantim Gravity”. (In some cases speakers did not give their permission to be recorded and in other cases the recordings were not audible due to technical issues.)

 

Workshops

Rethinking Emergence

University of Lisbon October 17-19 2019

Positive characterisations of emergence tend to focus on the causal or qualitative novelty of dependent properties in relation to the physical states upon which they depend. Metaphysicians attempting to make sense of emergence have traditionally concluded that there are certain kinds of novelty—particularly novel causal powers—that would rule out physical realization, and more generally, any kind of physical grounding. For this reason, strong emergence has been viewed with suspicion. Recently, however, the orthodoxy according to which strong emergence and realization are incompatible has come under pressure from a range of sources. Philosophers of physics and biology, for instance, draw attention to case studies in which it seems we get strong kinds of dependent novelty or autonomy without ruling out physical grounding. Within metaphysics too there is renewed interest in the development of ways of making sense of dependent novelty without the mystery of traditional strong emergence, for instance neo-Aristotelian theories that focus on the roles of structure and form. The purpose of this workshop is to bring together leading experts on emergence, from the philosophy of the physical sciences, and both ancient and contemporary metaphysics, to explore old and new perspectives on the relationship between emergence, realization and novelty.

An edited volume of the proceedings of this workshop featuring many of the speakers below and several invited contributions is under contract with OUP, titled Rethinking Emergence. Amanda Bryant and I are co-editing, watch this space for further updates! List of contributors and titles will follow shortly…

Speakers:

Carl Gillett
Compositional Explanations and Mutualist Models in Scientific Emergentism: An Integrative Pluralist Account
What we might term “Challenging Compositional Cases” are found across the higher sciences from chemistry to molecular biology to neuroscience and beyond. These examples each involve a number of kinds of successful model, but still have aspects crying out for explanation. Scientific emergentists have offered a novel class of “mutualist” models to provide such understanding. In order to better understand both the Challenging Cases, and mutualist models, I survey the neglected “compositional models” driving compositional explanations in these cases and across the higher sciences. First, I highlight how there are a number of species of compositional model and the common features of this family. Second, I detail how “integrative pluralism” (Mitchell (2002), (2003), (2004)) is true of both the species of compositional models and related causal models. We thus see why it is a false dichotomy to demand either “synchronic” or “diachronic” models, or forms of “emergence”, for some phenomenon, since we often have both when integrative pluralism holds true. More importantly, I show that Challenging Compositional Cases are of just this integrative pluralist variety where we apparently have successful, integrated causal and compositional models, but none the less the differential powers or activities of the relevant components still require explanation. I highlight how scientific emergentists have consequently offered their novel type of mutualist model, positing whole-to-part determination, to explain the differential powers of components in a fashion integrated with existing causal and compositional models. Appreciating compositional and other models, within an integrative pluralist perspective, thus allows us to begin to understand the exciting innovations, in novel models, ontology, laws, and more, that scientific emergentists have recently offered to gain traction at the cutting-edge of contemporary science.

Benj Hellie
From Emergentism to Expressivism
A venerable case for strong emergentist positions in the philosophy of mind appeals to broadly “semantic” considerations, namely a purported yawning gulf between the apparent character of physical facts and the apparent character of mental facts. Strong emergentism, however, raises familiar metaphysical difficulties perhaps better avoided. Fortunately, this is compatible with saving the semantic phenomena, through an expressivist interpretation of mental discourse: if I say ‘it is a fact that it looks to Fred as if something green is before him’, I mean the same as when I say ‘it looks to Fred as if something green is before him’; when I say ‘it looks to Fred as if something green is before him’, I express my empathetic reflection on Fred; and the only “descriptive” input to that reflection consists of nonmental information about Fred’s stimuli and behavior. So in acknowledging mental facts, we take on no metaphysical commitments. Unsurprisingly, the story does not end here: the mental has to go somewhere. Avoiding collapse into solipsism, the mental is pushed into the foundations of logic; fortunately, that is a move we should probably make anyway.

Robin Hendry
Reduction and Emergence: Where is the Evidence?
In this paper I raise an epistemological question about a metaphysical debate. Reductionism and emergentism are two broad conceptions of how the world could be. They are, in the broadest sense of the word, theories, and they are abstract enough and distant enough from everyday experience to qualify as metaphysical theories. They seem to rely on science for their support. Thus, for example, philosophers and scientists have used examples from the physical sciences to defend both emergentist and reductionist positions. My epistemological question concerns what form these arguments should take.

Paul Humphreys
Can transformational emergence produce a change in the laws of nature (or vice versa)?

Some recent accounts of diachronic ontological emergence seem to allow the laws of nature to change, although they do not require it. The possibility raises some questions that will be addressed in the talk: what sense of nomological possibility is involved? Are changes in laws consistent with synchronic reduction? What account of laws or dispositions is best suited to nomological changes that accompany diachronic emergence? Is it possible to avoid an explanatory regress of superlaws that has some serious ontological content, rather than as a conventionalist stratagem? Is there a way to accept changes in fundamental properties or entities without being committed to nomological change?

William Jaworski
Hylomorphic Emergence
Physicalists and dualists share a common understanding of the natural world: the physical universe, they say, is a vast sea of matter and energy that can be in principle described by our best physics. Both are committed to denying that physical materials can combine to form emergent individuals—composite individuals with powers distinct from those of the physical materials composing them. Emergentists disagree, something that commits them to a composition operation different from the fusion operation of standard mereology and contemporary hylomorphic operations like Kit Fine’s principles of embodiment. A composition operation of the needed sort can be found in Aristotle’s hylomorphism. After describing the theoretical roles that hylomorphic form plays in Aristotle’s framework, I outline a hylomorphic theory that provides emergentists with the kind of composition operation they need, and that implies the falsity of the assumptions that motivate the dualist-physicalist divide.

Eleanor Knox
Functionalism and (Spacetime) Emergence
Philosophers of physics have used functionalism in various fields in order to shed light on emergent phenomena. Nonetheless, the proposed relationship between functionalism and emergence remains obscure. I will argue that functionalism does little directly to help us understand emergence, or the dependence relations underlying weak emergence, directly – but it is nonetheless helpful to emergentist accounts, because emergent entities (and entities that emerge in ways that deviate from standard metaphysical stories) can be clearly understood to play functional roles. I’ll focus on the example of emergent spacetime, building on arguments offered by Sam Baron, but also argue that the conclusions apply quite generally.

Anna Marmodoro
The Emergence of Emergence
Plato writes in the Theaetetus: “a syllable is, not the letters, but some one kind of thing which has come into being out of them: something that has one form of its own, and is different from the letters” (203e, J McDowell’s translation). Has Plato here discovered emergence? So it has been argued. I analyse the passage in question, in Plato’s Theaetetus, which can be fairly described as a metaphysical crescendo in mereology. I will nevertheless argue that Plato did not discover emergence, and explain why, contrasting it to the paradigm of metaphysical emergence in Aristotle’s account of substances.

Sandra Mitchell
Challenges for a bottom-up approach to the reality of emergent phenomena

A number of philosophers of science have defended the view that causation is the foundation of positing what is real. That is, we infer what phenomena exist from our experience and experiments. The stability of phenomena is what accounts for replicability of results from repeated experiments and convergence of results from different types of experiments. If replication fails or experimental results diverge then the reality of the phenomenon is doubted. These arguments depend on assumptions about the reliability of detection procedures as well as the stability of real phenomena. I will argue that dynamical emergent phenomena, by which I mean system level properties and structures that arise from and are maintained by interactions both among components of the system and with environmental features, present challenges for the standard inference from replication and convergence to realism.

Michael Silberstein
Contextual Emergence in Complex Biological Systems

I will define a kind of emergence that is distinct from weak and strong emergence called contextual emergence. I will then give examples of contextual emergence from cognitive neuroscience and systems biology. Contextual emergence is a type of explanation that emphasizes the equal fundamentality of contextual constraints and relations at multiple interacting scales (including the environment relatively speaking). Contextual constraints include global constraints such as network/topological properties, and global organizing principles such as plasticity, robustness, etc. Contextual constraints are not merely inputs, boundary conditions, essential background conditions for mechanisms, etc. Contextual constraints can be symmetric, such that X and Y can simultaneously act as contextual constraints for one another. Contextual constraints can be causal-mechanical or dynamical explanations, but can also involve non-causal difference makers such as the global organizing constraints/principles mentioned above, conservation laws, free energy principles, least action principles, etc. That is, contextual constraints need not involve anything structural like direct causal-mechanical or dynamical interactions. The relevant and determining contextual features will vary from case to case, and from explanation to explanation, but constraints may be more or less concrete or abstract, to include topological and dimensional constraints such as universality classes. Contextual constraints can even be behavioral, social, normative, etc.

Contextual emergence provides a framework to understand two things: A) how novel properties are produced, and B) why those novel properties matter. Contextual constraints ‘modally’ create, constrain and maintain systems. Modal-talk here is pluralistic and subsumes various causal, nomological and non-causal constraint-based explanations. These contextual constraints represent both the screening off and opening up of new areas of modal space. Moreover, these modalities are the result of constraints that are multi-scale and involve multi-scale interactions. In all such cases what we take to be basic parts and their dynamics get constrained, determined, or overridden by contextual features allegedly ‘outside the system,’ often at different interacting scales, and thereby new and stable patterns arise. Lastly, I’ll argue that contextual emergence is the best way to make sense of any kind of robust ontological emergence.

Alastair Wilson
Emergence as Higher-Level Naturalness
In this paper I offer a (potentially) new conception of emergence, which works by distinguishing between fundamentality and perfect naturalness and endorsing the thesis that there are perfectly natural properties at non-fundamental levels. I take as my starting point Elizabeth Barnes’ proposal to characterize the emergent as fundamental but dependent, and argue that this proposal undermines much of the theoretical work that we wish fundamentality to do for us. I propose an alternative account of the emergent as non-fundamental (and dependent) but perfectly natural, and explore some initial consequences of this account for debates over emergentism and reductionism.

Jessica Wilson
On the Notion of Diachronic Emergence
Though most accounts of emergence take this to be a broadly synchronic phenomenon, it has been recently maintained that there are distinctively diachronic forms of emergence (see, e.g., O’Connor and Wong’s 2005 account of strong emergence, Mitchell’s 2012 dynamic self-organization account of emergence, and Humphreys’ and Sartenaer and Guay’s 2016 accounts of ‘transformational emergence’). Here I argue that there is no need for a distinctively diachronic notion of emergence, as purported cases of such emergence can either be subsumed under broadly synchronic accounts, or else are better seen as simply cases of causation.

New Mechanism, Reduction and Emergence in Physics, Chemistry and Biology

University of Lisbon October 14-15 2021

This conference addresses the epistemological and ontological significance as well as the scope of new mechanism and, in particular, its relationship with the topics of reduction and emergence in the physical, chemical and biological sciences. As it is well known, new mechanism was elaborated to overcome the limits of the neo-positivist philosophy of science and, in particular, the nomological model of scientific explanation. Still, it is also true that new mechanism is supposed to be new vis-à-vis the classical atomistic mechanism from the XVII century.

Being so, what should we take to be the real novelty of the so-called new mechanism? What may be the ontological reasons underlying the adoption of mechanistic instead of other modelling strategies (e.g., network analysis)? Furthermore, does new mechanism fit the phenomena studied by contemporary sciences? For example, how can mechanistic explanations fit contemporary physics, for instance quantum field theory, astroparticle physics or condensed matter physics? Additionally, what can be the new mechanistic position on the ongoing debate about the different notions of reduction and emergence, either in ontological or epistemological terms? How can the new mechanistic model of explanation be compatible with a certain notion of reduction and still accommodate a non-trivial notion of emergence? Are mechanistic explanations necessarily reductive, given that many involve intertheoretical identities? Finally, in what sense emergence and reduction can be taken as direct opposite and/or complementary views within the new mechanistic approach?

Talks:

Brigitte Falkenburg – Mechanistic Explanations in Physics: History, Scope and Limitations
Nancy Cartwright & John Pemberton – Mechanistic vs. Covering Laws Explanation: a False Conflict
Robin Hendry – Mechanisms in Chemistry
Stuart Glennan – The Many Mechanisms of Emergence
Alvaro Moreno – The Ontology of Research Strategies in the Life Sciences
William Bechtel – Organisms Need Mechanisms; Mechanisms Need Organisms

Follow the links for YouTube videos of the talks.

For full details please see the conference website here. An edited volume (Springer) of the conference proceedings plus invited contributions will follow shortly! More details will be posted when available.

 

Emergence and Reduction in Science and Metaphysics

University of Lisbon July 27-29 2022

Location: Amphitheatre FCiências.ID, Faculty of Sciences of the University of Lisbon
Building C1, Floor 3, Campo Grande, Lisbon

Special sciences such as chemistry, biology and psychology seem to be autonomous from physics, with successful intertheoretic reductions at a premium. Focusing on the philosophy of science, it is easy to conclude that in addition to fundamental physical entities, kinds, laws and explanations, there are also distinctive kinds, laws and explanations at higher levels of analysis. When we focus on the metaphysics of interlevel relations, however, it becomes hard to see how there could be autonomous special sciences: if special science processes are grounded in fundamental physical entities and processes, then it seems the special sciences should be ontologically reducible to physics.

Should our understanding of science be informed by relatively a priori metaphysics concerning relations such as grounding, emergence, realization and composition? Or should the autonomy of the special sciences be taken as a datum to be explained by a relatively a posteriori metaphysics? This workshop, hosted by the Emergence in the Natural Sciences project based at the University of Lisbon, aims to address the interplay between metaphysics and the philosophy of science in addressing these issues. It is jointly organized by the Lisbon emergence project, Tuomas Tahko’s Metascience project (Bristol) and Alastair Wilson’s Framephys project (Birmingham). It will feature short talks and longer keynote addresses over 3 days, involving members of the projects’ research teams and invited speakers.

Speakers (shorter talks)
Nicholas Emmerson (Birmingham) “It ain’t that deep: Metaphysics and the Problem of Progress”
Joaquim Giannotti (Birmingham) “Strong Emergence and Weak Fundamentality”
Michael Townsen Hicks (Birmingham) “Agency Considerations in Natural Modality”
Katie Robertson (Birmingham) “The Emergence of Statistical Mechanical Probabilities from Entanglement”
Alastair Wilson (Birmingham) “Metaphysical Emergence as Higher-level Naturalness”
Vanessa Seifert (Athens) “Molecules as Quantum Objects”
Alexander Franklin (KCL) “How the Universe Plays Dice: Emergent Probabilities in Physics”
Francesca Bellazzi (Bristol) “Biochemical Kinds”
Toby Friend (Bristol) “The Determinable World Hypothesis”
William Morgan (Bristol) “Does Reduction Entail Identity?”
Samuel Kimpton-Nye (Bristol) “Modal Anti-Realism: The Really Poisoned Pawn”
Tuomas Tahko (Bristol) “Making Reductionism True”

Keynote Speakers
Naomi Thompson (Southampton) “How (and why) to be an Antirealist about Metaphysical Explanation”
David Papineau (KCL / CUNY) “What Causal Inference tells us about Causation”
Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers) “Ground Physicalism”

Programme

Wednesday

13:30—14:00 Welcome / Coffee
14:00—14:45 Nicholas Emmerson: It ain’t that deep: Metaphysics and the Problem of Progress
14:45—15:30 Joaquim Giannotti: Strong Emergence and Weak Fundamentality
15:30—16:00 Coffee Break
16:00—16:45 Michael Townsen Hicks: Agency Considerations in Natural Modality
16:45—18:00 Jonathan Schaffer: Ground Physicalism

Thursday

09:30—10:00 Coffee
10:00—10:45 Katie Robertson: The Emergence of Statistical Mechanical Probabilities from Entanglement
10:45—11:30 Alastair Wilson: Metaphysical Emergence as Higher-level Naturalness
11:30—11:45 Coffee Break
11:45—12:30 Vanessa Seifert: Molecules as Quantum Objects

12:30—14:00 Lunch

14:00—14:45 Alexander Franklin: How the Universe Plays Dice: Emergent Probabilities in Physics
14:45—15:30 Francesca Bellazzi: Biochemical Kinds
15:30—16:00 Coffee Break
16:00—16:45 Toby Friend: The Determinable World Hypothesis
16:45—18:00 Naomi Thompson: How (and why) to be an Antirealist about Metaphysical Explanation

Friday

09:30—10:00 Coffee
10:00—10:45 William Morgan: Does Reduction Entail Identity?
10:45—11:30 Samuel Kimpton-Nye: Modal Anti-Realism: The Really Poisoned Pawn
11:30—11:45 Coffee Break
11:45—12:30 Tuomas Tahko: Making Reductionism True

12:30—13:30 Lunch

13:30—14:45 David Papineau: What Causal Inference Tells us about Causation

You can find abstracts for the talks here.


Seminars

May 30 2019 (FCUL): Karen Crowther
When do we stop digging? Conditions on a fundamental theory of physics
In seeking an answer to the question of what it means for a theory to be fundamental, it is enlightening to ask why the current best theories of physics are not generally believed to be fundamental. This reveals a set of conditions that a theory of physics must satisfy in order to be considered fundamental. Physics aspires to describe ever deeper levels of reality, which may be without end. Ultimately, at any stage we may not be able to tell whether we’ve reached rock bottom, or even if there is a base level – nevertheless, I draft a checklist to help us identify when to stop digging, in the case where we may have reached a candidate for a final theory. Given that the list is – according to (current) mainstream belief in high-energy physics – complete, and each criterion well-motivated, I argue that a physical theory that satisfies all the criteria can be assumed to be fundamental in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

May 31 2019 (LanCog): Karen Crowther
Levels of fundamentality in the metaphysics of physics
Judging by how physicists use the term, there are many different conceptions of what it means for a physical theory to be ‘fundamental’. Yet, it has been argued that none of these imply metaphysical fundamentality. Here, I argue that there is a plausible sense of relative fundamentality in physics that corresponds to a fairly standard conception of relative fundamentality according to metaphysics. I discuss what the implications of this are for our understanding of ‘levels’ of fundamentality and explanation.

June 6 2019 (FCUL): Christian Wuethrich
Spacetime is as spacetime does (Joint work with Vincent Lam)
Theories of quantum gravity generically presuppose or predict that the reality underlying relativistic spacetimes they are describing is significantly non-spatiotemporal. On pain of empirical incoherence, approaches to quantum gravity must establish how relativistic spacetime emerges from their non-spatiotemporal structures. I will argue that in order to secure this emergence, it is sufficient to establish that only those features of relativistic spacetimes functionally relevant in producing empirical evidence must be recovered. In order to complete this task, an account must be given of how the more fundamental structures instantiate these functional roles. I will illustrate the general idea in the context of causal set theory and loop quantum gravity, two prominent approaches to quantum gravity.

June 7 2019 (LanCog): Christian Wuethrich
Does spacetime functionalism have to be universal? (Joint work with Vincent Lam)
In past work, Lam and I have defended spacetime functionalism as a response to the problem of the emergence of spacetime in quantum theories of gravity. But can spacetime functionalism be such a local response to a specific problem in one class of physical theories? One might think not, at least not if held jointly with a sufficiently strong version of scientific realism: if we accept that quantum gravity implies that spacetime is at best emergent, then we should have been antirealists about it all along, i.e., already in earlier theories such as general relativity. A “pessimistic metainduction” thus appears to force the joint commitment to scientific realism and to spacetime functionalism to render the latter a universal template, rather than a local solution to a specific problem. In my talk, I will resist this universalism, and argue that a local spacetime functionalism is compatible with an appropriate form of scientific realism.

September 25 2020 (LanCog): David Papineau
Why Sensory Consciousness can’t be Essentially Representational
Representationalism about sensory experience might be intuitive, but it faces the metaphysical challenge of explaining why conscious character (what-it’s-likeness) and representational content (correctness conditions) should be metaphysically intertwined. I shall argue that representationalism lacks the resources to do this. Attempts to defend representationalism by appealing to “transparency” only deepen the difficulties. In truth, representational content is metaphysically incommensurate with conscious character.

To watch the video of this talk, click here.

November 13 2020 (LanCog): Joaquim Giannotti
The Fundamentality of Fundamental Powers
Dispositional essentialism is the view that all or many fundamental properties are essentially dispositional, or powers. The literature on the dispositional essence of powers is abundant. In contrast, the question of how to understand the fundamentality of fundamental powers has received scarce interest. Therefore, the fundamentality of powers stands in need of clarification. There are three main conceptions of the fundamental, namely as that which is: (i) metaphysically independent; or (ii) belonging to a minimally complete basis; or (iii) perfectly natural. Here I present and discuss each of these approaches from the viewpoint of dispositional essentialism. I show that (i) is incompatible with the metaphysics of powers and (ii) – (iii) have more drawbacks than merits. Therefore, the dispositional essentialist should favour a different approach. To this end, I defend a primitivist conception of the absolute fundamentality of powers, which has the virtues of (i) – (iii) but none of the vices.

To watch the video of this talk, click here.

November 20 2020 (LanCog): Tuomas Takho
Natural Kinds, Mind-Independence, and Unification Principles
A group of entities may share a number of properties without being a natural kind (say, all green and round things). It’s often enough for our scientific goals of explanation and prediction that there are one or more shared properties among a given sample set. Yet, there is more to being a member of a natural kind than sharing properties with other members of the kind. There have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind real, chief among them is the criterion according to which natural kinds must be mind-independent. But it is difficult to specify this criterion: many seemingly natural kinds have an element of mind-dependence. I will argue that the mind-independence criterion is nevertheless a good one, if correctly understood: the mind-independence criterion concerns the unification principles for natural kinds. Unification principles explain how natural kinds unify their properties.

To watch the video of this talk, click here.

December 2 2020 (Lisbon Mind and Reasoning Group): Marek McGann
Emergence from what, though? Concepts of the psychological medium in embodied cognitive science.
Several related approaches to cognitive science, including the enactive, ecological, or embedded varieties, share a tendency towards an emergentist conception of the cognitive agent and its environment. This sometimes leads them to claims of a relationship of mutuality, or reciprocality between agent and world. An emergentist perspective might lead us to ask the question as to the medium from which (or in which) this mutual relationship is emerging. I would like to examine a couple of different ways in which the concept of the medium has been deployed in cognitive science, within the enactive and ecological approaches in particular, and explore some of the implications an emergentist perspective has for how we think about the medium, and go about framing research questions in light of it.

To watch the video of this talk, click here.

February 19 2021 (LanCog): Davide Romano
The Classical Limit of Quantum Mechanics: One World, Many Routes
This talk is a presentation of my FCT research project: The Emergence of the Classical World From Quantum Mechanics, hosted by the Centre of Philosophy at the University of Lisbon. The project deals with the problem of the classical limit of quantum mechanics, which can be framed as follows: why does a collection of quantum systems (elementary particles, atoms, molecules) in ordinary macroscopic conditions generally form a classical object (a table, a chair, a human being)? Why does this transition happen, and under which conditions? Nowadays, the standard answer to this problem is given by decoherence theory: when a quantum system interacts with an external environment, it loses some of its characteristic quantum effects (it “decoheres”) and, when measured, it looks like a classical object. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in the literature on what has been really achieved by decoherence and the role it plays in the different interpretations of quantum mechanics. The project will investigate these issues, seeking to provide a comprehensive and ontologically clear account of the classical limit of quantum mechanics.

The talk will be divided into two parts. In the first part, I will present the merits and limits of decoherence. I will show that, despite the experimental success of decoherence, this theory (in the standard context) is unable to provide an explanation of the quantum to classical transition that goes beyond a pure instrumentalist approach. In the second part, I will briefly discuss the role and significance of decoherence theory in three different interpretations of quantum mechanics: the de Broglie–Bohm theory, the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory and the Everett/Many Worlds Interpretation. For each of these interpretations, indeed, not only can the problem of the classical limit be framed differently, but even decoherence itself plays either a different role or no role at all. Even though no definite results will be provided, I will suggest what further steps should be taken in order to develop a clear account of the classical limit.

To watch the video of this talk, click here.

***

Emergence Project Seminar

This seminar series is co-organized by Amanda Bryant and me. All talks will all be over Zoom, here is the link:

Topic: Emergence Project Seminar

Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or Android: https://videoconf-colibri.zoom.us/j/84705629515?pwd=bWVITk5iTzZUZWVRMmYzSEJOSDlKdz09
Password: 817996

Or iPhone one-tap: 308810988,84705629515# or 211202618,84705629515#

Feb 24 2021 15:00 – 17:00: Claudio Calosi (University of Geneva)
Making Determinable Indeterminacy Precise
According to the determinable based account of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) there is MI when there is an indeterminate state of affairs, a state of affairs in which a constituent object has a determinable property but fails to have a unique determinate of that determinable. In this paper, I first discuss and refine the determinable model. In the light of this refinement, I go on to challenge some crucial claims that are frequently made in the literature.

To watch the video of this talk, click here.

Mar 10 2021 15:00 – 17:00: Kate Pendoley (Hunter College)
Explaining Emotional Feelings
At least part of why we care so much about our emotions is because of the way they feel. And it often seems that each emotion has its own distinctive feeling—indeed, many have argued that it is these distinctive feelings which render emotions’ epistemic roles importantly similar to the epistemic roles of sensory states. But how should we explain these emotional feelings? In this paper, I argue that neither the characteristic valence and intensity of emotion, nor the bodily feelings sometimes associated with emotion, is sufficiently fine grained to individuate each emotion, and that we are unlikely to discover additional dimensions. Accordingly, this paper argues that we need to take a new approach to explaining emotional feelings and points out implications for emotions’ epistemic roles.

Mar 24 2021 15:00 – 17:00: Samuel Kimpton-Nye (University of Bristol)
Pandispositionalism
Some philosophers maintain that physical properties are irreducibly modal; that properties are powers. Powers are then employed to provide philosophical explanations of other phenomena of philosophical interest such as laws of nature and modality. There is, however, a dispute among powers theorists about how far the powers ontology extends: are all manner of properties at all levels of fundamentality powers or, are powers only to be found among the fundamental properties? I argue that the answer to this question depends on the details of the metaphysics of powers. More specifically, I argue that if one understands powers as qualitative grounds of dispositions (call this qualitative dispositional essentialism), as opposed to properties whose essences are constituted by dispositions (as orthodox dispositional essentialists would have it), then all properties are powers, i.e., pandispositionalism is true. The conclusion: If qualitative dispositional essentialism is true, then pandispositionalism is true, is significant because there is increasing concern that orthodox dispositional essentialism is explanatorily deficient and perhaps even incoherent, meaning that qualitative dispositional essentialism is gaining increasing support in the literature on powers. All things considered, then, it is beginning to look more likely that pandispositionalism is true simpliciter.

To watch the video of this talk, click here.

Apr 7 2021 15:00 – 17:00: Celso Alves Neto (Dalhousie University)
What is it that Evolves?
Traditional formulations of natural selection assume that entities undergoing selection form lineages. This assumption motivates recent claims that multispecies microbial communities do not undergo selection. Yet, these claims are controversial in part because the role and nature of lineages are poorly understood. In this paper, I clarify these issues by revisiting David Hull’s notion of units of evolution. Lineages are units of evolution in traditional formulations of natural selection, while the entities that form lineages are units of selection. I revise this idea in two ways. First, we argue that lineages can also be units of selection. Second, I argue that units of evolution do not have to form clear parent-offspring relations. With this aim in mind, I analyze a set of borderline cases of lineage and the underlying notions of reproduction and inheritance. Our analysis offers a framework to compare traditional and more recent formulations of evolution by natural selection. It also helps to clarify how multispecies microbial communities might evolve.

To watch the video of this talk, click here.

Apr 21 2021 15:00 – 17:00: Alison McConwell (University of British Columbia)
Individuality by Design: Conventional Ideals & Rebellious Nature
Abstract: Individuality is a topic of study that crosses disciplinary boundaries (e.g. Clarke 2016, Pradeu 2012, Gilbert et al 2012, Huxley 1912). A recent anthology investigates how individuality in science cannot be understood until one includes their contexts of application (Bueno et al. 2018). A theme of that collection concerns how individuality concepts manifest through scientific experience and practice. Their focus extends beyond to what extent the natural world is comprised of discrete and bounded individuals and their corresponding typologies. So, rather than focus on the metaphysical nature of individuals, one aim is to direct attention towards how scientists individuate and how they might use individuality concepts in their work. Similar to Kendig’s (2016) proposed shift from natural kinds to kinding, recent work on individuality has shifted from characterizing individuals to activities of individuating in order to better understand their role in the scientific process. By drawing from examples of data classification and comparative analysis as observed activities of scientific communities, I offer a view about ‘individuality’ as a double-barreled term according to a pragmatic conceptual analysis (e.g. inspired by James 1912, Dewey 1925). After an inventory of three different practice-oriented approaches to biological individuality, a fourth option is pursued. Using three cases to draw rough principles from individuality in action, I demonstrate how individuality in science can be designed by the very normative structures it helps to build. Community-established methodological choices both constrain and design the individuating actions that scientists take. This suggests that individuality in biology is carefully designed: conventional ideals and protocols that shape individuating activities are adjusted in the face of an often uncooperative and rebellious nature. Individuating activities are shown to matter by how they reveal norms of a scientific community, such as norms that guide fieldwork in early stages of data collection. The notion of individuality used throughout the paper is in a sense much wider than just individuating biological organisms, but the paper’s focus remains within the biological domain. One consequence concerns the viability of the philosophical retooling on which my analysis is based, and whether philosophical analyses of scientific activity can be further refined by broadening methodological tolerance to include qualitative social science techniques.

To watch the video of this talk, click here.

May 05 2021 15:00 – 17:00: Ylwa Wirling (University of Gothenburg)
Neutrality and Force in Field’s epistemological objection to Platonism
Hartry Field (1989) famously challenges Platonists to explain the reliable match between mathematical truth and belief. The challenge grounds an objection claiming that Platonists cannot provide such an explanation. This objection is often taken to be both neutral with respect to controversial epistemological assumptions, and a comparatively forceful objection against Platonists. I argue that these two characteristics are in tension; no construal of the objection in the current literature realises both, and there are reasons to think that no such version of Field’s epistemological objection can be constructed.

To watch the video of this talk, click here.

May 19 2021 16:00 – 18:00: Alyssa Ney (UC Davis)
Three Arguments for Wavefunction Realism
Wave function realism is an interpretative framework for quantum theories which recommends taking the central ontology of these theories to consist of the quantum wave function, understood as a field on a high-dimensional space. I will present and evaluate three standard arguments for wave function realism and clarify the sort of ontological framework these arguments support.

To watch the video of this talk, click here.

June 02 2021 15:00 – 17:00: Haixin Dang (University of Leeds)
Group Belief Revision and Scientific Change
Group beliefs are not static. While there have been many different proposals about what group beliefs are (or are not) and how they are formed, group belief revision has surprisingly received little philosophical attention. In this talk, I am particularly interested in epistemic groups, which are primarily formed in pursuit of epistemic goals. Scientific communities and research teams are paradigmatic epistemic groups. In order to understand group belief change, we must examine how previous groups belief constrain and guide the acquisition of new beliefs. Gilbert (2000) and Weatherall and Gilbert (2016) propose that joint commitment underlies how group members can respond to new evidence. Gilbert argues that how groups are jointly committed to previous belief can explain scientific change: why old paradigms may take a long time to be replaced. In this talk, I present a new framework for thinking about group belief change. Under my view, well-functioning epistemic groups are epistemically prudent, but not dogmatic. Groups have to settle disagreement among its members over what constitutes evidence for a belief, what are the standards for evaluation of that evidence, and to what extent other beliefs must be revised. Scientific groups are resistant to certain kinds of new evidence, but I argue that this resistance is not necessarily irrational.

To watch the video of this talk, click here.

June 16 2021 15:00 – 17:00: Emad Atiq (Cornell Law School)
Does Acquaintance Naturalized Retain its Epistemic Significance?
Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in the view that in perception, subjects bear an epistemically significant cognitive relation directly to particulars that is importantly different from thinking truths about a particular. Some call this relation ‘acquaintance.’ A question in the theory of acquaintance is whether the relation can be naturalized—that is, whether we can account for its nature relying exclusively on the objects and relations countenanced by the natural sciences. I propose to make some progress on this question by examining acquaintance’s normative profile. By ‘normative profile,’ I mean the characterization of acquaintance presupposed by our evaluative judgments about the relation. I argue, first, that acquaintance seems to exhibit intrinsic epistemic value. Moreover, acquaintance appears valuable for a singular subject and in virtue of the unmediated cognitive contact with a perceived object it affords. Finally, in being epistemically good for the subject in this way, the acquaintance relation ‘stands out’ from relations in its vicinity. A naturalistic reduction of acquaintance (and perception, more generally) fails to preserve these evaluatively apparent characteristics of acquaintance. Acquaintance, naturalized, puts the perceived object at a distance from an essentially disunified subject, and the relation seems one among many similar relations. Hence, if perception/acquaintance must be naturalized, we must accept not just that our intuitions about acquaintance are illusory, but that our situation is not as valuable (or valuable in the same way) as our epistemic intuitions present it as being.

June 30 2021 15:00 – 17:00: Debbie Roberts CANCELLED
Normativity: Supervenience and Dependence
That the normative supervenes on the non-normative, and that the normative depends on the non-normative is relative orthodoxy in metaethics. Both are widely held to be conceptual truths, operating as constraints on competence with normative concepts. The orthodox view ignores the possibility of genuinely thick concepts, and genuinely thick properties and facts. In this paper I discuss the implications of the genuinely thick for normative supervenience and dependence, and how this brings into view neglected positions on the metaphysics of the normative.